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Police Primacy: Organizing Police Powers under the Palestinian
Authority
Abstract
The Secretary of State established the Office of the United States Security Coordinator for
Israel and the Palestinian Authority (USSC) in 2005 to meet U.S. commitments under the
Middle East Roadmap for Peace. USSC’s vision is to strive for a civilian-controlled, selfsustaining, affordable, and accountable security structure, focused on “police primacy”,
operating within the rule of law while providing necessary law enforcement to safeguard
the Palestinian people. This vision is far from accomplished: Palestinian Authority (PA)
security forces continue arbitrary detention, torture, and use of excessive force. This article
examines the wide applicability of police powers – premised as the main reason for chaotic
law enforcement activities within the PA’s security forces – agency by agency, and by
considering both laws in force and proposed draft legislation. The article ends with
recommendations to institutionalize police primacy by means of regulation.
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Introduction
The Secretary of State established the Office of the United States
Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) in
2005 to meet U.S. commitments under the Middle East Roadmap for
Peace. United States Security Coordinator’s vision is to strive for a
civilian-controlled, self-sustaining, affordable, and accountable security
structure, focused on “police primacy” operating within the rule of law
while providing necessary law enforcement to safeguard the Palestinian
people.1 This vision is far from accomplished.
In both the West Bank and Gaza, the security forces have become
authoritarian tools used by Palestinian leadership to control and limit
political participation and silence freedom of expression.2 PA security
forces continue arbitrary detention, torture, and use of excessive force.3
The death of activist Nizar Banat while in custody of the Preventive
Security Organization in the West Bank on 24th June 2021 is a recent
example of this.4 Banat had levelled criticism in which he accused PA’s
leaders of corruption and abuse of power for personal gain. Banat’s
death prompted calls for an investigation by the UN, EU, and the US
state department.5
This article examines the wide applicability of judicial police powers,
premised as the main reason for chaotic law enforcement activities
within the PA’s security forces, and provides recommendations to
institutionalize police primacy by means of regulation. The British
government originally developed the concept of police primacy in the
1970s with the aim to build a normal, modernized police organization
in Northern Ireland. The ideal of a normalized police service refers to
policing that is publicly acceptable, accountable, politically neutral,
ethnically representative, impartial, demilitarized, committed to the
use of minimum force, and primarily concerned with enforcing the
ordinary criminal law instead of exceptional security measures.6
Putting security under governmental control with proper mechanisms
of accountability is nowadays a more emphasized aspect of police
primacy.7 “Police primacy” is defined here as giving prime
responsibility for law enforcement activities over civilians to a police
service of a civilian nature that is bound by the rule of law and general
principles of police duties. These principles include the following:
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•

•

•

•
•

The police respect fundamental and human rights and, in
exercising their powers, choose from all reasonable options
the course of action that best asserts these rights;
Police action is reasonable and proportionate to the
importance, dangers and urgency of the duty, the objective
sought, behavior, age, health of the involved parties, and
other factors that impact on the officers’ overall assessment
of the situation;
The police refrain from action that infringes anyone’s rights
or causes anyone harm or inconvenience more than is
necessary to carry out their duty;
The police exercise their powers solely for the purposes
granted by the law; and
The police seek to maintain public order and security
primarily through advice, requests, and orders, using force
only when this is justifiable to prevent an immediate risk of
an offense or some other dangerous act or event.

Palestinian Security Branches
Annex I (Protocol concerning Redeployment and Security
Arrangements) of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement of 1995
(Oslo II Accord) allows the PA to establish six distinct security
branches:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Civil Police ()الشرطة المدنية, which became the Palestinian Civil
Police (PCP),
Public Security ()األمن العام, which turned into the National
Security Forces (NSF),
Preventive Security ()األمن الوقائي, which became the Preventive
Security Organization (PSO),
Presidential Security ()األمن الرئاسي, which turned into the
Presidential Guard (PG),
Intelligence ()المخابرات, which became General Intelligence
(GI), and
Emergency Service and Rescue ( خدمات الطوارئ واإلنقاذ/
)الدفاعالمدني, which changed to Civil Defense (CD).

The PA has over time added two new security branches, namely the
Customs Police (CP) and Military Intelligence (MI). The construe of
Palestinian security branches has evolved since the Oslo Accords phase
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through legislation issued by the PA (see Figure 1).8 The Constitution
makes a distinction between the police and the security forces.9 The
Law of Service in the Palestinian Security Forces in turn recognizes
three different security force clusters: The National Security Forces and
the Palestine National Liberation Army, the Internal Security Forces,
and the General Intelligence.10 When assessing these two laws together,
one can distinguish security forces that focuses either on public security
(PCP, CD and CP), other internal security (PSO and MI), external and
presidential security (NSF and PG), or intelligence (GI).
Figure 1. Construe of Palestinian Security Branches

Source: Author.
It is important to understand the dichotomy between legal instruments
dealing with administrative and financial management, which apply to
all security forces, and those regulating the functions, powers, and
structure of individual security forces.11 For example, the Law of Service
in the Palestinian Security Forces is a legal instrument that cover the
entire security apparatus. However, out of all the individual security
forces, three out of eight still operate without any specific legal
foundation: The NSF, the PG, and MI. Moreover, the legislation that
specifically applies to security forces does not only contain gaps, but
also internal overlaps.12 It is this loose legislative situation that helps
undermine the civil police having primary responsibility for
apprehension, arrest, and detention of civilians as well as other such
police powers.13

The Capacity of Judicial Police
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Members of police are naturally vested with judicial police powers.14
However, it is not just the police, but most PA’s security force assign
these powers.15 Does this mean that all security authorities are
harnessed by law in this regard? This article addresses the question by
examining each security branch separately and by considering both
laws in force and proposed draft legislation.
Palestinian Civil Police
The PCP is an internal security service falling under the Ministry of
Interior.16 In Area A of the West Bank, the PCP is the PA’s main law
enforcement body. The PCP handles ordinary police functions such as
combating crime and upholding public order and oversees the PA’s
prisons. It has various sub-branches, including criminal investigation,
drug enforcement, public order, traffic, emergency response, and
women’s police. Major General Youssef al-Helou heads the PCP. He is a
member of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council and the PLO’s Palestinian
National Council. Al-Helou previously led the Military Training
Authority for security forces. He has reportedly received his military
training in Iraq, Bulgaria, and East Germany.17
Police officers and non-commissioned officers of the PCP have the
status of judicial police when performing their duties, albeit only within
its specified jurisdiction.18 The top five tasks of the PCP are to:
•
•
•
•
•

Maintain public order and security, public morals, and public
peace,
Protect lives and property,
Prevent and fight crime and arrest the perpetrators,
Combat riots and all transgressions of public security, and
Assist other security forces and public authorities in the
performance of their duties.19

When performing their duties, the police must do so in accordance with
the Palestinian law and international treaties. They must also adhere to
standards of transparency, impartiality, integrity, accountability,
respect for human rights and public freedoms, and honor and
implement court judgements. Hence, the police must respect and
consolidate the rule of law and judicial independence and, when
discharging their responsibilities, not discriminate based on race,
gender, color, religion, political opinion, or disability. Article 4 of the
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Law by Decree Concerning the Police enshrine these tenets, also known
as the general principles of police duties.
The law states that no person may be arrested except by order of the
competent authority.20 Such an authority is the Deputy-Prosecutor,
who has the right to issue a writ of summons.21 Police officers and noncommissioned officers in turn execute the writs, by force if necessary.22
However, officers and non-commissioned officers may arrest any
person without a warrant if there is sufficient evidence to lay a charge,
for example, a felony or misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for
at least six months or if the perpetrator resists the police or tries to
escape from the place of detention.23
A person who has been arrested must be carried by the police to the
police station. The station officer in charge must then investigate the
basis for the arrest. If the arrested individual is detained for more than
24 hours, the Deputy-Prosecutor may request that a Magistrate Judge
extends the detention for a maximum of 15 days.24 There are several
guarantees of due process for the detainees, such as the right to be
examined before interrogation to establish any visible injuries and the
reasons for their occurrence.25

Preventive Security Organization
The PSO is a security force within the Internal Security Forces,
primarily attached to the Ministry of Interior but which also appears to
report directly to the President. The PSO has become one of the most
powerful security forces in Palestine. The organization works closely
with the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency and Israeli security
agencies. Major General Ziad Hab al-Reeh heads the PSO. In January
2022, he became Minister of Interior in the government of Prime
Minister Mohammed Shtayyeh. Hab al-Reeh is also a member of
Fatah’s Revolutionary Council, and he has been a long time Fatah
activist in the West Bank, dating back to before the First Intifada.26
The officers and non-commissioned officers of the PSO have the
authority of judicial police.27 Their duties include:
•

Protecting the Palestinian internal security,
84
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•
•

Investigating crimes that threaten the internal security of the
PA, and
Detecting criminal activity that targets government
departments and public bodies and institutions.28

The PSO is supposed to respect the rights, freedoms, and guarantees
set forth in the Palestinian law as well as international treaties, but in
practice the organization is for the most part accountable to no public
authority.29 It is also noteworthy that the bylaw for the PSO does not
include general principles of police duties, in other words there is no
mention of proportionality, minimum intervention, and equal
treatment.
Officers and non-commissioned officers of the PSO can make arrests
without a warrant if, for example, a suspect commits a crime, or is
accused of committing one, or refuses to give his or her name and
address to the PSO operative.30 However, the provisions of the Law of
Penal Procedure concerning the basis for an arrest and the requirement
for a physical examination of a detainee do not apply to the PSO. This is
because the obligation to investigate the basis for an arrest concern
only the police officer in charge of a police station, and because DeputyProsecutor, an authority that the PSO do not have to pay regard to, is in
charge for the physical examination and record of any visible injuries.
Moreover, all information, activities, and documents pertaining to the
work of the PSO are confidential,31 with the Director-General of the
organization obliged only to notify the Minister of Justice and the
Attorney-General of the status of prisoners in the PSO’s detention
centers.32
Civil Defense
The CD is a security service within the Internal Security Forces
attached to the Ministry of Interior.33 Major General Youssef Nassar
heads the CD. The CD’s personnel in the Ministry of Interior and
anyone delegated by the line minister have the authority of the judicial
police to enforce the provisions of the Civil Defense Law and to execute
decisions in that regard.34 The duties of the CD are to:
•
•

Prepare and supervise projects and work plans regarding CD,
and to research methods of CD and public relations,
Take all necessary measures to respond to natural
catastrophes and emergency situations, and
85
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•

Inform citizens about CD activities.35

The main reason the CD possesses judicial police powers is so officials
can access to private property to verify the implementation of measures
set forth under the Civil Defense Law or any decisions issued under
that law. The owners of real estate and buildings must, at their own
expense, comply with such decisions and orders and to implement all
measures and activities necessary for CD purposes.36 This, in turn,
means that the powers of search and handling of seized objects are of
most relevance for CD’s officials in their capacity as judicial officers.
The guarantees of due process for search and seizure, as laid out in the
Law of Penal Procedure, apply to CD’s personnel as judicial police.37 If
needed, they can also call for the assistance of the PCP to gain access to
places and to search premises.38
Customs Police
The CP is a security service within the Internal Security Forces.39
Administratively, the CP comes under the Ministry of Interior, but it
reports on technical and practical issues to the Ministry of Finance and
Planning.40 Major General Iyad Barakat leads the CP. The CP officers
and non-commissioned officers have the role and powers of judicial
police in carrying out their duties.41 The main functions of the CP are
to:
•
•
•

Combat customs smuggling and tax evasion,
Control the movement of goods that cross the borders of
Palestinian territories, and
Confiscate settlement goods and impose fines as set out in
Law by Decree No. 4 of 2010 on Banning and Combating the
Products of the Settlements.

The guarantees of due process laid out in the Law of Penal Procedure
apply to members of the CP in the performance of their duties as
judicial police. However, it is unclear if the general principles of police
duties, as stipulated in the Law by Decree No. 23 of 2017, also apply to
the CP. Whether this is so or not is a matter of legal interpretation. A
human rights sensitive interpretation would suggest that the CP is
bound by general principles of police duties as stipulated in Article 4 of
the Law by Decree No. 23 of 2017 concerning the Police.
General Intelligence
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The GI is an intelligence service that falls under the direct command of
the President.42 Major General Majed Faraj leads the GI. He holds the
rank of Minister43 and is a member of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council.
Faraj in the only security chief with a political role. He is one of
President Abba’s closest confidants and a possible successor. Faraj has
good relations with the US and Israel.44
With a staff of about 3,000, the GI wields significant power and targets
political opponents and dissenting activists. The service collects
intelligence, exercise counter-espionage, liaises with foreign
intelligence services, and commands a paramilitary force. Its officers
are plainclothes and conduct both covert and public operations. The GI
consists of officers and individuals who must all, unlike the other
security services and forces, be academically qualified for the job.45 GI
personnel also have the powers of judicial police.46 The duties of the GI
are to:
•
•

•

•

Conduct security activities both within and beyond the
geographical boundaries of Palestine,
Prevent acts that may endanger the security and safety of
Palestine, and take measures against perpetrators acting
against these interests,
Reveal external dangers that may jeopardize the Palestinian
national security through espionage, collusion, and sabotage,
and any such acts, and
Cooperate with the intelligence agencies of friendly states to
counter acts that may threaten peace and security.47

As judicial police, GI personnel are allowed, among other things, to
conduct preliminary investigations and searches and interrogate
suspects.48 However, provisions of the Penal Procedure Law on
examining physical condition of the detainee before the interrogation
do not apply to the GI. Neither do the GI Law nor its bylaws contain
general principles of police duties, such as principles on
proportionality, minimum intervention, and equal treatment.49
Pursuant to the GI Law, a manual for the GI members regulating their
demeanor and ethics is to be issued. Whether such a manual exists is
not known.50 Besides all this, information regarding the GI and its
activities is a matter of national security, hence beyond the reach of any
external legal oversight.51
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Military Intelligence
The MI is a security service under the direct authority of the
President.52 The MI is responsible for collecting intelligence on the
external military environment, but in practice operates as an internal
security police to repress opposition elements within Fatah, including
people serving in other security services and forces. It has an estimated
force of 1,700. Major General Zakaria Musleh leads the MI. Like most
of the security chiefs, Musleh is also a member of Fatah’s Revolutionary
Council.53
The MI consists of commissioned and non-commissioned officers,
assistants, and other staff.54 Since April 2014, MI personnel have been
vested with judicial police powers by President Abbas.55 This decision
includes no formal constraints so all the standard powers enacted in
the Law of Penal Procedure are available for the MI. As for the GI,
many of the guarantees of due process also do not apply to MI since
these safeguards were written for the police. Given that the MI is one of
the three services with no legal framework, there are no general
principles of duty or ethics to guide or restrain MI’s use of police
powers.
The MI embodies the Military Security Department that exists to assist
the military judiciary, Security Forces Justice Commission (SFJC), in
the implementation of SFJC’s functions and decisions. These functions
include investigating and preventing crimes or activities that threaten
the security forces.56 Hence, the Military Security Department is most
likely the body within the MI that exercise in practice the police powers
formally granted to the MI. The draft Law by Decree concerning
Military Intelligence Service proposes that the Military Security
Department within MI be transformed to Military Police, a special force
that reports only to its commander.57
The power concentration of the MI is remarkable. All the chiefs and
commanders of security services and forces, commissions, and
directorates must provide the MI with any information it requests,
while all Ministries, governmental agencies, public commissions, and
institutions are compelled to cooperate with the MI in its spheres of
authority.58 One of those spheres is the safety of security forces’
formations, headquarters, camps, bases, and equipment, wherever they
may be.59
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Presidential Guard
The PG is a security force that reports directly to the President. It is
considered an elite force, with approximately 2,500 personnel, whose
mandate that includes personal protection of the President, counterinsurgency, and rapid interventions. Major General Munir al-Zoabi
leads the PG. Expectedly, he is a member of Fatah’s Revolutionary
Council. He joined the PLO security forces and Fatah military wing in
1974.60
The PG consists of commissioned and non-commissioned officers. The
personnel of PG are not vested with the capacity of the judicial police,
and the draft bylaw on PG does not refer to such powers in the future.
However, the said bylaw proposes to establish a Department of Special
Intelligence inside the service. That department would undertake,
among other functions, the following duties:
•
•

Investigating activities and crimes that threaten the PG, and
Conducting preliminary investigation and collecting evidence
of the crimes committed by the service personnel in
cooperation with the competent authorities.61

Such a formulation would enable the PCP to take charge of preinvestigation into PG personnel suspected of crimes committed on duty
but that task would presumably fall to the Military Security
Department of the MI.
National Security Forces
The NSF is a military-like security force in Palestine headed by the
Minister of National Security and subordinate to the Commander-inChief, in other words, the president.62 The NSF is the successor to the
Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), also known as Palestine’s army-inwaiting. The NSF has nine battalions, which altogether have about
10,500 personnel. Major General Nidal Abu Dukhan leads the NSF. He
is also a member of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council. Dukhan has
received military training in Algeria, USA, France, and Switzerland. He
has previously served in PSO, PG, and MI.63
The NSF’s current role is to support other PA security services and
forces. The NSF is also Military Liaison tasked with security
coordination with Israel via District Coordination Offices (DCO). As the
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other PA security forces coordinate more directly with Israel, such as
the PSO and GI, the Military Liaison coordinates day-to-day civil
matters.64
The NSF consists of officers, non-commissioned officers, and
individuals, wherever located.65 NSF personnel are not currently vested
with the powers of the judicial police, but the draft bylaw suggests
otherwise. The bylaw proposes that the NSF would respond to any
support request made by any of the security services or forces through
the Joint Central Operations Center, which includes all the security
authorities, managed by NSF. Under a unified operation order, the NSF
would respond to internal security intervention to handle any breach in
public security. The NSF commander would be in the position to
approve on such intervention. Most remarkable, the NSF recruits
would receive the capacity of judicial officers while supporting the
other security services and forces.66 How this capacity would manifest
in practice remains unclear in the absence of explanatory notes.

Summary
The objective of this article is to examine the applicability of judicial
police powers in PCP, PSO, CD, CP, GI, MI, PG, and NSF. See Table 1
for the results of this examination. The Law by Decree on the NSF is
still only a draft, in other words, a proposal.
Table 1. Judicial Police Powers in the Palestinian Authority Security
Sector

Source: Author.
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The first finding is that seven out of eight Palestinian security forces are
vested with the capacity of judicial police. The sole exception is the PG.
The second finding is that only two out of the seven authorities with
police powers are obliged to respect general principles of police duties
and adhere to all the guarantees of due process as stipulated in the Law
of Penal Procedure. The PSO, GI, and MI are examples of PA’s security
authorities with inadequate regulatory safeguards as regards using
police powers responsibly and, above all, in a manner that respects
fundamental and human rights.
Recommendations
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance has identified several
key challenges that continue to undermine the rule of law and good
security sector governance in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.
Those challenges include, among other things, weak strategic planning
and management, ineffective oversight, and lack of a clear legal and
policy framework.67 As regards the legal framework, each security force
should have their own distinctive and precisely formulated roles and
responsibilities. The legislative solution of the PA to vest almost all the
security authorities with police powers is unsustainable, and conducive
to causing more human rights violations in the future. This is the
background around the rule of law and good governance to the
following recommendations for the way forward:
1. Clearly legislate the obligation of the CP and to-be-established
Military Police to respect general principles of police duties, as
well as the Military Police’s responsibility to adhere to all
safeguards stipulated in the Law of Penal Procedure.
2. Enact detailed provisions on cooperation and coordination
between PCP, CP, and Military Police to ensure appropriate
division in the performance of the law enforcement functions
and occupational safety for personnel in all three services.
3. Issue provisions on cooperation also between the three police
services and all the other PA security forces to, among other
things, exchange information required in discharging prescribed
functions of the different security authorities.
4. Codify situations requiring executive assistance, as well as the
conditions for providing such assistance in all laws or bylaws
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specific to each security force or service. Naturally, the
performance of police duties should in all situations remain
under the direction and guidance of the police.
5. Leave only PCP, CP, and Military Police with full judicial police
powers, when all the above is accomplished.
6. It is imperative to separate the Military Police from the MI, both
legislatively and in practice, to prevent abuse, or overuse, of
power. The MI should not have authorization to arrest and
interrogate suspects.
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